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This article addresses the Syrian regime’s strategic communication as a practice of 
politics that runs hand in hand with its repressive political, social, and military tactics to 
control the political sphere, win the ongoing civil war in the country, and violently 
suppress its opponents since the Syrian uprising began in March 2011. Drawing on 
primary and secondary sources as well as discourse analysis of Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad’s main speeches since 2011, the article suggests that this strategy is a dynamic 
practice of politics that combines the mobilization of media and cultural genres as 
technologies of power with a political language rooted in the Ba’ath Party’s ideology to 
legitimate the regime’s war against its opponents, ensure support, and summon citizens 
as political subjectivities. 
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This article addresses the Syrian regime’s strategic communication1 post-2011 as a dynamic 
practice of politics that mobilizes media (and cultural genres) as commodities of regime power, and an 
already existing Ba’thist “culture of communication,”2 to reproduce regime power; control the political, 
cultural, and symbolic spheres in Syria; and ensure regime survival particularly during situations of conflict. 
Drawing on unpublished research that I conducted in Syria3 before the uprising, primary and secondary 
sources, and discourse analysis of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s main public speeches since March 
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1 The term strategic communication has for the most part been addressed in the literature in terms of 
causality, policy, and outcomes, particularly in relation to international relations, rather than its significance 
to domestic or local practices of politics (see, e.g., Farwell, 2013; Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2013; Simpson, 
2012).  
2 The term culture of communication underlines the crucial link between language and culture and is 
proposed by Atef Alshaer (2008) as a concept that refers to the “compendium of religious, historical, 
literary and mythological references used by any community as valid tropes for all times” (p. 104). 
3 I carried out field research on the cultural and media landscape in Syria over a number of weeks in 2009 
and 2010. However, field research could not be continued following the uprising because of safety 
considerations. 
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2011, this article suggests that the Syrian regime’s strategic communication practices had pervaded social, 
cultural, and personal spaces since the late president Hafez al-Assad came to power in a military coup in 
1970, running hand in hand with other regime practices and measures intended to control the political 
sphere; ensure regime survival; summon Syrians as political subjects of the nationalist Ba’thist ideology; 
bind Syria’s mosaic of ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups4 as members of an imagined Arab nation; and 
set the limits about what can be said in public “about a particular topic at a particular historical moment” 
(Foucault, cited by Hall, 1997, p. 44). 
 
This proposition draws on two interrelated dynamics. The first is an understanding of culture as 
discursive (semiotic) practices of meaning-making, an understanding that demands analytical attention to 
how actors use words, symbols, images, and spectacle for different purposes, including normalizing regime 
power in different historical contexts; the second sees communication and politics as coconstitutive in 
constructing consensus, altering public affect, producing political subjectivities, and promoting ideological 
regimes of representation that become material when “inscribed in practices” (Althusser & Hall, cited in 
Wedeen, 1999, p. 12). The proposition does not mean that ideological regimes of representations are 
believable or accepted without resistance—in fact, the Syrian uprising was, in essence, composed of acts of 
popular resistance to such ideological regimes and power structures—but to address the practices the regime 
had consistently used to mobilize regimes of representation to cultivate power in ways that are taken for 
granted. 
 
In his book Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy, Syrian dissident and 
intellectual al-Haj Saleh (2017) refers to the nationalist Ba’thist ideology, in place since 1963, as the 
“doctrine of absolute Arabism” (p. 92). Such a doctrine, he writes, envisages that 
 
Syria is an Arab country that . . . along with the other Arab countries, comprises the 
Arab homeland. It also claims that the Arab identity of these countries is essential, 
definite and entirely defines all residents, lands and states. . . . The most prominent 
feature of Ba’thist Arabism is seen in its project of complete political and intellectual 
homogenization that was undertaken inside Syria . . . [to] . . . create uniformity among 
all Syrians and to position Ba’thism as their profound truth, the Ba’th party as the carrier 
of their eternal message as Arabs. (pp. 92–94) 
 
According to the Ba’th Party doctrine, all Syrians, irrespective of sect, religion, or ethnicity, had 
to be actively constructed as Syrian Arab nationals, an appellation combining the significant identity 
markers of Syrian and Arab identities together, and made visible in various symbols and references, such 
as in the official name for Syria as the Arab Syrian Republic and in the names of state institutions, 
including the media (e.g., state television is called the Syrian Arab TV and the army the Syrian Arab 
Army). However, despite these practices, the founding Ba’th project that intended to build a “Syrian Arab 
Nation” in which sectarianism and tribalism would supposedly cease to exist never materialized. In fact, 
although the party recruited from all ethnicities and religions, it exploited sectarianism as a political 
                                               
4 As of 2010, Syria’s population was roughly 65% Sunni Arab, 15% Kurdish, 10% Alawite, 5% Christian, 
3% Druze, 1% Ismaili, and 1% Twelver Shia. For details, see Balanche (2018). 
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practice that the late President Hafez al-Assad maintained, ensuring that key members of the “Alawite 
constituency,”5 to which he belonged, remained in key posts, such as in the army, state institutions, and 
the secret services, thus establishing a system of power that helped the revival of sectarianism during 
particular sociohistorical contexts. 
 
There are practically no studies that have specifically addressed the Syrian regime’s strategic 
communication as a practice of politics before and since the uprising. However, since 2011, several 
studies have discussed the multiple contested mediated narratives that have emerged in the course of the 
uprising-turned-war (e.g., Crilley, 2017; Matar, 2016) and the deployment of a dominantly sectarian 
narrative by diverse actors during the course of the conflict (al-Rawi, 2015; Badran & Smets, 2018). Other 
studies have specifically focused on media use by the Islamic State and other Islamist groups (e.g., Melki 
& Jabado, 2016), and others have addressed the role of social media platforms in the uprising-turned-civil 
war (e.g., Ahmed & Hamasaeed, 2015; Shehabat, 2011). Before 2011, a few critical works (although not 
specifically using the concept of strategic communication) incorporated critical cultural analysis in 
discussions of the Syrian regime’s power and longevity despite various setbacks and challenges, including 
an uprising by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 that was violently suppressed by the regime (see, 
e.g., cooke, 2007; Wedeen, 1999). These studies have provided nuanced analysis of the regime’s 
mobilization of culture, its relationship with elites as well as with media and cultural producers, and the 
mechanisms through which cultural producers had helped sustain and communicate the regime’s power. 
 
In her seminal study of Syria’s political system under the late President Hafez al-Assad, Lisa 
Wedeen (1999) provides an intricate analysis of the sophisticated mechanisms the regime put in place to 
induce obedience and compliance among the population. In her work, she addresses what she terms the 
ambiguity, but also powerful reach, of the regime’s political project that used market-oriented language 
and images in newspapers, plays, books, and television shows to promote an Assad personality cult, which 
served to enforce “obedience, induced complicity, isolated Syrians from one another, and set the 
guidelines for public speech and behavior” (p. 159).6 However, Wedeen also makes clear that although 
Syrians publicly endorsed the regime as a form of dissimulation, they privately pushed the boundaries of 
compliance and obedience, an argument also advanced by miriam cooke (2007) in her analysis of 
underground and subversive dissidence in Syria in the late 20th century. In her book Dissident Syria, 
cooke underscores how the Syrian regime actively intervened in culture and sought to mold it, posing 
dilemmas to an earlier generation of Syrian artists, writers, and intellectuals torn between the desire to 
criticize power and the obligation to compromise with it. Focusing on Syrian visual cultural production, 
media anthropologist Christa Salamandra (2008, 2011) provides the first detailed ethnography of Syrian 
musalsalat (television serials) and their producers, and their continued commitment to the regime’s tanwir 
(enlightenment) political ideology, an argument taken further by Donna Della Ratta (2017) in her 
                                               
5 The term Alawite constituency does not suggest that the community is homogenous as there are 
different tribes and clans within this consistency. 
6 In her book, Wedeen (1999) suggests that the Assad cult produced a certain internalization of categories 
or “frames” of thinking that shaped “the way people see themselves as citizens” (p. 19). This was 
achieved through the regime’s use of cult as a disciplinary practice, supplemented by the provision of 
socioeconomic benefits. 
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theorization of the relationship between cultural producers and the regime as a whisper strategy that 
reflects the strategic necessities of both sides and that constructs this accommodation as being part of a 
homegrown national project. 
 
Broadly speaking, Syrian political elites, like other elites in postcolonial states, saw culture as a 
potential catalyst for social change and national progress, a view in alignment with the Ba’th Party’s desire 
to centralize all cultural practices under government-controlled apparatuses. This view was also central to 
former President Hafez al-Assad’s “corrective movement,” which formed the basis of his rule and which 
aimed to shape and construct Syrian national identity as an Arab national identity while managing 
expectations of freedom and upward mobility. Over the period of his rule (1970–2000) and after his death 
when his son Bashar took over, the concept of tanwir (literally meaning enlightenment) would come to 
inform, and be used interchangeably with, the regime’s political language related to economic and political 
reforms as well as discourses of citizenship (Wedeen, 2013). More recently, Della Ratta (2017) addresses 
how tanwir, as a political ideology, materialized into new forms of regime-sponsored visual cultural output 
genres, underlining the convergence of the regime’s and the cultural producers’ needs in the ideological 
discourse of tanwir, a mutual mode of accommodation that cooke (2007) calls “commissioned criticism,” a 
condition in which the work of intellectuals who see themselves as being critical of the regime is appropriated 
by the regime as a political strategy. 
 
Any analysis of the Syrian regime’s strategic communication warrants a detailed study of the 
interdependency between language and culture and among media, cultural producers, and the regime 
over time; the role of other institutions (such as the powerful security apparatus and the army) in helping 
maintain the status quo; the socioeconomic and sociopolitical realities that have informed cultural and 
social belief; the demographic make-up of Syria; the persistence of a patronage system that gave the 
minority Alawite community material privileges in exchange for political support; the emergence and rise 
of the Islamic State and other Islamist groups, international and regional intervention, and geopolitical 
considerations; as well as continued support from its allies, Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—complex pursuits 
beyond the scope of this article. Furthermore, such an analysis must also critically engage with the 
regime’s strategic communication as practiced and produced in diverse cultural platforms and genres: 
spectacle, film, music, art, symbols, satire, images, performance, novels, and poetry. However, given the 
complex evolving context of the Syrian conflict, which has involved a variety of actors and has seen an 
explosion in new cultural genres and media platforms as spaces of war, I limit the analysis to addressing 
the regime’s mobilization of various media spaces as commodities of power and the mobilization by 
President Bashar al-Assad of a political language that essentially reiterates the key tropes of the long-
standing Ba’athist culture of communication. I focus on Assad’s political language as a significant 
discursive practice of meaning-making and as a “site of, and a stake in, struggles for power” (Fairclough, 
1989, p. 15) that supplements other sites and practices of struggle in moments of crises. Fundamental to 
the discussion, however, is Syria’s prenetworked media environment and the relationship between the 
regime and culture, which I briefly attend to next. 
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Media as Technologies of Regime Power 
 
Syria gained its independence from France in 1947, beginning a period of leadership change and 
unrest that lasted until the 1963 takeover by the Ba’th Party and the imposition of a state of emergency. Like 
many of its neighbors, Syria began its independent existence as an artificial entity with few resources. Within 
20 years, it was transformed under Hafez al-Assad into a regional power, supported by a powerful security-
based (mukhabarat) institutional structure and strong state institutions. As in any authoritarian context, the 
media—newspapers, radio, and television—effectively served as technologies of power in the service of the 
regime. In the case of Syria, the media, I suggest, served as tools in what Ismail (2018) calls a “civil war 
regime developed as a form of government . . . [that] . . . rests on and creates the condition of a latent 
permanent war between rulers and ruled” (p. 189). 
 
For more than 40 years, Syrian media spaces were largely closed and driven top-down to secure 
support, help build an effective state structure, and promote the ruling Ba’thist ideology as a force of national 
unity and modernization opposed to feudalists, the bourgeoisie, and bureaucrats co-opted by international 
capitalism. Modernization and reform, according to the Ba’thist discourse, envisaged the transformation of 
the ordinary Syrian citizen into an agent of progress that could neither be enforced nor imposed by law or 
government decree; rather, it could be achieved through the work of institutions of the modern state—the 
school, the army, the party, and the media. As such, since the takeover by the Ba’th Party of power, the 
three main state-controlled daily newspapers, Tishreen, Al-Ba’ath, and Al-Thawra, along with the Syrian Arab 
News Agency, state radio, and television, were all entrusted with promoting the Ba’th ideology and 
communicating high expectations pertaining to developmentalist aims as well as to the production of Syrian 
citizens as Arab nationalists and patriots who believe in the goals of the party and in Syria’s Arab identity.7 
 
Satellite television, introduced in 1994, was placed under regime control, and Internet access was 
carefully monitored and regularly blocked. In the 1990s, when the Internet became available in the region 
and exposed Syrians, like other Arabs, to diverse opinions and information, the regime allowed some private 
ventures into audiovisual production, enabling private TV companies to officially operate inside the country 
with limited autonomy as part of a process defined as “selective liberalization” (Heydemann, 1993, p. 88), 
under which state institutions began to loosen their control over key economic sectors, but retained their 
leveraging power over media and culture. Although this move offered some space for cultural interventions 
in the public sphere, cultural producers remained committed to the regime’s solid ideological platform as a 
basis for an agreement over “a shared commitment in the name of progress, development and modernism” 
(Della Ratta, 2018, p. 19). 
 
The first decade of Bashar al-Assad’s rule after he became president in 2000 ushered in a period of 
some reforms amid a new atmosphere of trust and hope fueled by talk about democracy and political rights, 
the establishment of civil society forums in Damascus and other places across the country, and some 
liberalization in the financial sectors. The period, known as the Damascus Spring, was also marked by the 
                                               
7 The narrative I offer does not deny that dissidents and dissident cultural production existed. In fact, 
several underground media operated over the years and different forms of transgression and opposition 
were to be found in novels, artwork, and satire. 
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increasing popularity of Syrian cultural production in the Gulf markets (see Della Ratta, 2018, for details), 
and the emergence of a new crop of dramas and documentaries known for their daring discussions of 
political and other taboo topics, including religion and sex as well as corruption and abuse of power.8 
Although these new products seemed to reflect a new sense of freedom and openness in the country, the 
state-controlled media continued to mobilize support for the regime and create legitimacy for the young 
Western-educated president, promoting his image as an enlightened leader committed to reform and 
tackling corruption and clientelism.9 At the same time, however, the regime slowly opened the door for 
independent media outfits. Much of the newly launched private media were controlled by wealthy 
businessmen with close connections to the regime, including Rami Makhlouf, who established the al-Watan 
newspaper; Majd Bahjat Sulayman, owner of Syria’s largest media empire and executive director of the 
Alwaseet Group; and other Syrian businessmen who established the independent television channel Dounia 
TV,10 which proved to be one of the most faithful allies to the regime since 2011. 
 
Communication Challenges of the Uprising 
 
It was not until the Syrian uprising, which began as a fledgling popular protest against regime 
power, repression, and economic deprivation in March 2011 in the wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions, that the Syrian media and cultural landscape underwent a radical transformation because of 
the phenomenal growth in alternative and protest media genres and spaces that followed the regime’s 
decision to allow Facebook access in February 2011. The explosion in alternative media and cultural 
spaces11 and the emergence of new networks pulling activists from inside and outside Syria disrupted the 
regime’s attempts to engineer seemingly reformist media content directed at educating the public on 
issues related to political rights and citizenship. 
 
Also challenged were the regime’s strategic communication practices as several large nodes of 
news curation and creative oppositional content emerged on Facebook and YouTube, including the “Syrian 
Revolution Against Bashar al-Assad 2011” and “Creative Memory of the Syrian Revolution” Facebook 
                                               
8 The argument is based on fieldwork I carried out in Syria in 2010, which included interviews with diverse 
cultural producers, journalists, and writers, including well-known novelist Khaled Khalifa. 
9 There is no space here to engage fully with these practices, but in the first decade of President Bashar 
al-Assad’s rule, his image as a benevolent, quiet, and man-of-the-people was heavily mediated in the 
Syrian media. Pictures of him visiting markets, ostensibly without any guards, along with his British-born 
charismatic wife Asma were displayed in different spaces, including public space. Regime supporters were 
keen to tell stories of his humbleness and quiet approach to politics, according to interviews during my 
fieldwork. 
10 I conducted interviews with the chief executive of Dounia TV, Fuad Sharbaji, in 2010 in which he 
confirmed that, although the new television station had dubbed itself the “Voice of the People,” it 
remained committed to working in line with regime directives. 
11 Roughly 100 new Syrian media projects were established after March 2011, according to Syrian 
journalists working in them. There were as many as 298 newspapers being circulated in different parts of 
the country during various periods of the uprising, in addition to 17 state-run or regime-affiliated 
newspapers (see “Syria’s New Media Landscape,” 2016). 
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pages, and in diverse cultural genres, satire, comedy, film, and music.12 New newspapers and television 
channels were established in diverse spaces while Syrian activists harnessed different communication 
technologies—including social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Skype, Twitter, and mobile 
phones—to expose the regime’s brutality, communicate with various revolutionaries across the country, 
coordinate military attacks, disseminate news and information about the revolution, and mobilize support 
through the use of diverse techniques and creative affective content. 
 
The challenge to the regime’s control of the mediated public sphere was publicly acknowledged in 
a speech that President Bashar al-Assad gave to the Syrian National Assembly on March 30, 2011, two 
weeks after the uprising began, in which he claimed that 
 
Syria had been subjected to a virtual war in the media and the Internet. . . . They 
wanted us to feel that things were over, and that our only choice was to surrender 
without putting up any fight . . . things are obviously more difficult because the Internet 
is more widespread and because the [communication] instruments are more modern. 
But the popular awareness we have seen was sufficient to respond very quickly. We 
need to strengthen this national patriotic awareness because it is the real force which 
protects Syria at every juncture.13 
 
Within a few weeks of his speech, the regime mobilized state media, newspapers, television, 
radio, and the ostensibly independent media channels, social media platforms, and online spaces to 
communicate images of spectacular violence, information warfare, propaganda, and false news about the 
uprising, as well as website defacement, denial of service attacks, and spying malware delivered via spear 
phishing e-mails against opponents. New media outfits (such as Sama TV and Sham FM radio), blogs, 
Twitter, and Facebook accounts, along with already existing proregime channels, such as Dounia TV 
established in 2010, intensified already-existing practices including that of changing or omitting facts14 
while spreading the regime’s narrative that Syria was facing a foreign conspiracy, a narrative that could 
not be objectively refuted given the regime-enforced ban on international and regional media. This 
informal ban excluded the Iranian Press TV; Lebanese Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV; and RT, the Russian 
television channel, which had complete access and freedom of operation since the military involvement of 
Russia in the conflict. 
 
A month after the uprising, the hacker group the Syrian Electronic Army was set up to carry 
out cyber warfare campaigns against regime opponents. It used a variety of techniques, such as 
jamming online portals with messages and hacking tactics (for details on the Syrian Electronic Army 
tactics, see Zambelis, 2012). Concurrently, a diverse range of activists and ordinary people calling 
                                               
12 See cooke (2016) for details of innovative creative oppositional content. 
13 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=305:president-bashar-
al-assad-s-a-speech-at-the-people-s-assembly-march-30-2011&catid=117:2011&Itemid=496  
14 http://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2011/04/05-4  
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themselves grassroots journalists began circulating fake news about the conflict, a practice that soon 
defined coverage of the Syrian conflict and that, as Omar al-Ghazzi (2017) writes, 
 
should be recognized as part of our political reality, as it influences the choices of political 
players involved in Syria. . . . On Syrian official media, such stories served as a pillar of a 
strategy to cast doubt on media representations of the conflict and enable the 
dissemination of outlandish claims about a universal conspiracy against the country. (p. 
13) 
 
These various individuals and groups included UK-based blogger Vanessa Beeley; self-proclaimed 
Lebanese journalist Samira Abdallah, who tweets under the hashtag @sahouraxo and has more than 125,000 
followers; and a crop of right-wing Facebook groups, such as the European Solidarity Front for Syria.15 One of 
the tactics these self-styled regime supporters deployed was the circulation in digital platforms of 
misinformation about major events in the civil war, such as the chemical attack on Eastern Ghoutta on April 7, 
2018, and repeating claims by the regime media that the attack was fabricated while circulating a YouTube 
video16 claiming that the victims of the attacks were actors who pretended they that had been wounded or 
killed. As part of their tactics, these pro-regime supporters also launched smear campaigns against antiregime 
groups, aid groups, and journalists seen as supporting the opposition, such as the White Helmets, a volunteer 
rescue organization twice nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize that was accused by Assad of being a “‘facelift’ for 
a jihadi group.”17 One of the most talked about smear campaigns, carried out by these individuals as well as 
regime supporters, was Beeley’s circulation of a video claiming that the White Helmets had faked rescue 
operations and that it had cooperated with takfiri (nonbeliever) militants in staging a chemical attack in Idlib 
Province.18 Such practices, also circulated widely in regime media, helped nurture multiple narratives of digital 
suspicion while generating a feeling of anxiety among Syrian and other publics,19 an anxiety accentuated by 
the fragmentation of the media in Syria and by the proliferation of multiple visual representations of violence 
circulated by diverse actors in the conflict and enabled by the participatory nature of networked media (see 
Della Ratta, 2017, 2018).20 
 
 
 
                                               
15  https://www.facebook.com/European-Solidarity-Front-for-Syria-280123615449307/  
16 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7zZmXDctmE released April 7, 2017, and circulated on 
proregime media. 
17  Assad interview with Swiss SRF1 TV, October 19, 2018. Retrieved from www.SRF1TV.com. 
18  See https://21stcenturywire.com/2017/10/09/white-helmets-state-sanctioned-terrorism-hollywood-
poster-boys-war/  
19 This argument is relevant in the case of Syria; however, it was not possible to conduct an audience 
study in the current conditions. 
20 The networked nature of the Syrian conflict cannot be ignored and neither can the proliferation of what 
Della Ratta (2018) calls the networked image or its implications. Such a discussion is relevant and 
important, but it is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on the regime’s strategic 
communication as a practice of politics. 
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Mobilizing the Ba’thist Culture of Communication 
 
Running hand in hand with the mobilization of media as commodities of power, the regime 
deployed a political language rooted in the existing Ba’thist culture of communication, which functioned as 
“a mode of ambivalent interpellation, a way of ‘hailing’ spectators that is effective even if its claims are 
not taken literally” (Wedeen, 1999, p. 32). Although prevalent in much of the regime’s media content and 
public discourses, this political language was particularly prominent in Bashar al-Assad’s21 few public 
speeches addressed to Syrian publics, and delivered in Arabic to institutional (parliament) or populist 
(Damascus University)22 settings. In most of Assad’s speeches between April 2011 and December 2017, 
he repeated dominant discursive tropes that had underpinned the Ba’ath culture of communication for 
more than four decades: Arab nationalism and Syrian national unity; a conspiracy discourse drawing on an 
“us and them” binary language, and a discourse of reform and citizenship. It is important to note that 
during his first 10 years in power, Assad’s political language was dominated by the discourse of good 
citizenship and reform, reflecting the country’s embrace of neoliberalism and the slow liberalization of 
politics, and underlining some pragmatism and adaptation in the regime’s strategic communication to 
diverse sociopolitical contexts. However, when the uprising began and escalated, Assad consistently 
mobilized the political language underpinning the Ba’th culture of communication, underlining the role of 
political language as a site of struggle over power. 
 
Indeed, in all the speeches addressed in this article, Assad persistently used a political language 
that sought to construct an image of Syria as the “Arab nationalist” regime par excellence, or a regime 
committed to the defense of Arab nationalism (Arabism) to elicit support for the founding Ba’th project of 
building a Syrian Arab nation irrespective of its diverse constituencies. In reiterating these tropes, Assad 
sought to lay claim to a united Syrian Arab identity as an imagined homogenous Arab identity that glossed 
over all different forms of identifications—religious, minority, ethnic, or sectarian.23 This language, in 
which he sought to summon Syrians as the “true Arabs,” was particularly evident in his speech to the new 
Syrian government on April 16, 2011, a month after the uprising, in which he described Syria as the 
“throbbing heart of the Arab nation . . . I hope you and I . . . will be able to speak for Syria, glorious Syria 
which is at the heart of the Arab nation [and] truly represents what our country stands for.”24 
 
                                               
21 I do not use Assad’s interviews, mainly because these are mostly aimed at outside political actors, his 
supporters abroad, and international publics. 
22 Assad did not make many public speeches and those he made often marked particular occasions, such 
as Army Day and meetings of government. However, he also gave several speeches at Damascus 
University and the Opera House, addressing young Syrians and economic elites. 
23 The question regarding Syria’s Arab identity is complex given the diversity of its population and 
divisions along ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines and because the regime is controlled by the Alawi 
minority sect, to which the president belongs. 
24 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=359:president-al-assad-
2011-damascus-university-speech&catid=117&Itemid=496  
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Furthermore, Assad consistently used the pronoun you (in the plural) as an inclusive move of 
address intended to summon his intended audiences both as symbolic and real participants in the 
formation and maintenance of the nation as a unity. This was apparent in his reinauguration speech on 
July 16, 2014, in which he stated, 
 
You [Syrians] have proven to the entire world that pressures and conspiracies only 
increase your determination to counter the challenges because . . . Syria has the 
interests of the Syrian Arab people and their national and pan-Arab objectives in mind.25 
 
Assad’s mobilization of an Arab nationalist political language was particularly evident in another 
speech he gave to the Arab Forum in Damascus on November 14, 2017, in which he said, 
 
Arab heritage and culture is the accumulation of the heritage and cultures of all the 
peoples who lived in this region throughout ancient and modern history. . . . Arabism is 
not a slogan . . . it is an inclusive civilized concept that includes everyone . . . all 
ethnicities, religions, and sects. It is a civilized status open to all . . . without 
exceptions.26 
 
Interestingly, in that same speech, Assad also sought to lay claim to another inclusive and 
powerful collective identity in the Arab world: that of the nation of Islam, making links between Islam and 
Arab nationalism and constructing them as complementary and mutually constitutive rather than 
oppositional. As he stated in the same speech, 
 
there is no contradiction between belongingness to Arabism and belongingness to Islam 
as they enhance each other. . . . Some have tried to undermine the relationship between 
Islam and Arabism [and] . . . some have accused Arabist ideology of being secular and 
atheist, but there is [emphasis added] an organic connection between Arabism and 
Islam. It is wrong to believe that one can be either Arab or Muslim.27 
 
Although his rhetoric was intended to respond to the crisis and the context of the evolving 
uprising, which saw Islamist groups, such as the Islamic State, use regular symbolic and visual references 
to Islam28 to mobilize support, Assad’s mobilization of a political language linking Arab nationalism with 
                                               
25 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1181:president-assad-
2014-inauguration-speech-july-16-2014&catid=311&Itemid=496  
26 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=326&Itemid=496  
27 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=326&Itemid=496  
28 The Syrian uprising was marked by the widespread use of religious spaces, symbols, and vocabulary by 
the protestors. For example, in the demonstrations, political slogans demanding freedom, justice, or the 
end of the Assad regime were combined with the chants of “Allahu Akbar” (“God is great”) and other 
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Islam was not new, but had been mobilized by the regime as a discursive strategy to ensure support. 
Indeed, Nicolas van Dam (1996/2011) writes in his book The Struggle for Power in Syria that although the 
Ba’th Party had sought to construct a united secular Arab society with a socialist system, this “did not 
imply that Islam was of secondary importance to Ba’thist Arabism. In the Ba’thist view, Islam constituted 
an essential and inseparable part of Arab national culture” (p. 17). 
 
Following the 1979–1982 uprising led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the regime began to 
promote a form of religious Arab nationalism to gain the support of pious Muslims, while former President 
Hafez al-Assad used religious references and symbols to mobilize the majority Sunni population especially 
following his repression of the Brotherhood revolt (Hilu Pinto, 2017). Since 2000, when Bashar al-Assad 
took over following the death of his father, the regime sought to construct an image of the Syrian 
president as a pious persona: Images of Assad praying and holding and kissing the Qur’an pervaded the 
media and everyday spaces (Hilu Pinto, 2017). 
 
Conspiracy Imagery, Conspiracy, and “Us and Them” Discourse 
 
From the beginning of the uprising, Assad also mobilized a binary political language of “us versus 
them” to differentiate between regime supporters as “loyalists” fighting “oppositionists” involved in a 
foreign-aided conspiracy against the nation and its unity. This language, intended to discredit opponents 
as terrorists funded by the West, by “enemies of the homeland,” or by “conspirators” who are clever, 
organized, and methodical was evident in a speech Assad gave to the People’s Assembly on March 29, 
2011, in which he stated, 
 
Syria today is being exposed to a big conspiracy, the threads of which stretch from far 
and close countries as it also has some threads inside the country . . . the conspiracy 
depends, as far as its timing not form, on what is going on in the Arab countries. . . . 
This is natural. Even we, in the government, did not know, like everybody else, and did 
not understand what was happening until acts of sabotage started to emerge. Then, 
things started to become clearer. They will say that we believe in the conspiracy theory. 
In fact, there is no conspiracy theory. There is a conspiracy.29 
 
The language of conspiracy has been a persistent discursive practice of politics that the regime 
has consistently used to legitimize its power and to justify the use of excessive violence against 
opponents, particularly during situations of flux. During the uprising-turned-war, Assad used it to mobilize 
support among young Syrians in the struggle for power. For example, in a speech at Damascus University 
                                                                                                                                            
references, reflecting the importance of Islam as a moral framework for society. Later on, Islamist jihadist 
groups would also use the same slogans in their mediated representations of spectacular violence and 
oppression. 
29 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=305:president-bashar-
al-assad-s-a-speech-at-the-people-s-assembly-march-30-2011&catid=117&Itemid=496  
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on June 20, 2011,30 Assad claimed that Syria had been facing “foreign” conspiracies that aimed at 
undermining national unit: 
 
What is going on in the street has several components: The first one are the people who 
have needs and they want the state to fulfill them; the second component is represented 
by those outlaws and wanted and who have targeted institutions who oppose them and 
the third component is the most dangerous despite of being small and it is represented 
through those who have the takfiri extremist ideology which we have experienced for 
decades when it tried to sneak to Syria and it could get rid of it due to its people’s 
awareness and wisdom.31 
 
Assad’s rhetoric, although adapted to the context of the uprising, conforms to the main discursive 
practices underpinning the Ba’th Party’s culture of communication that sought to use a binary language to 
construct an image of Syria as being in a constant war with outside forces, including extremist Islamists, 
and to depict every form of internal opposition as an attempt to collude with the enemy against the nation 
(see al-Haj Saleh, 2017). It also conforms to the Syrian regime’s practice of mobilizing an “us versus 
them” discourse (those with us and those against us) to construct regime opponents as mortal enemies 
that deserve to be banished or eliminated. The use of such discursive practices as modalities of politics not 
only serve to provoke polarization and the entrenchment of divisions in the country, but also importantly 
contribute to, as al-Haj Saleh (2017) writes, “widespread paranoia . . . [where] every outsider [is] as an 
evil conspirator and every insider as a good friend” (p. 107).32 In reality, this language is intended to 
provide legitimacy to the practice of literally eliminating opponents by killing them through upholding 
perceptions of threats that can come from Israel or the West or from civil strife based on sectarianism and 
ideological discrepancies that were evident in the coup-ridden years before 1970. 
 
Salwa Ismail (2018) takes the argument further, suggesting that the regime had actively sought 
to create the conditions of 
 
a permanent war between rulers and ruled and between different components of society 
differentiated along various lines of division; sectarian, tribal, ethnic, regional, urban–
rural and class . . . in Syria, these divisions along an overarching political divide between 
two camps that, for simplicity, I refer to as loyalists and oppositionists . . . through a 
constellation of practices and techniques, a division of the population into “us” and 
                                               
30 Before the uprising, Assad had nurtured the young elite generation of Syrians as a new class of 
entrepreneurs and actors involved in his tanwir project. 
31 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=359:president-al-assad-
2011-damascus-university-speech&catid=117&Itemid=496  
32 Al-Haj Saleh (2017) notes that another technique mobilized to divide people was the spread of the 
belief that if we do not kill them, they will kill us, a phobia that has become one of the basis for sectarian 
uniformity and making distinctions between us and them. 
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“them” was enacted—“us” to be read as the Assad regime and its loyalists and “them” 
as opponents or the opposition constituted as expendable. ( p. 189) 
 
The analysis of the speeches shows that Assad consistently sought to delegitimize the uprising by 
framing it as a “foreign insurgency” or a “terrorist plot” rather than a popular uprising. This language was 
evident in his speech at Damascus University on June 4, 2012, a year after the uprising and at a time 
when the popular protests were gaining support, in which Assad claimed that 
 
there is no such a thing as an armed resistance movement—these are terrorist cells 
aided and funded by the West. Things were clear to us from the early days of the 
aggression. We all remember the reactions of those who did not believe or were not 
convinced of what I said at the beginning of the crisis. At the time, many people rejected 
terms like plot and aggression . . . [but] . . . conspiracies are natural around us. That’s 
why we shouldn’t give this component a lot of attention. What’s important for us is to 
focus our attention on strengthening our internal immunity inside Syria.33 
 
In other speeches, Assad used the label takfiri (nonbeliever) in referring to opponents, describing 
them as allies of Islamist extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda. For example, in a speech to the National 
Assembly on January 6, 2012, he claimed that 
 
Takfiris, terrorists, al-Qaeda members calling themselves Jihadis streamed from 
everywhere to command the combat operations on the ground. . . . We are fighting 
those, most of whom are non-Syrians, who came for twisted concepts and fake terms 
they call Jihad, but nothing can be farther from Jihad and Islam. Most of them are 
terrorists instilled with al-Qaeda thought, and I believe that most of you know how this 
kind of terrorism was fostered three decades ago in Afghanistan by the West and with 
Arab money.34 
 
In addition to labeling regime opponents as takfiris, Assad consistently sought to construct links 
between opponents and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, claiming that all were “terrorists taking 
cover under Islam. . . . If we go back to the 1970s and 1980s when the devil’s brothers [Muslim Brothers] 
carried out their terrorist acts, we find ourselves facing a race between terrorism and reform.”35 His 
invocation of the Muslim Brotherhood and their revolt in Hama in 1982, which was violently crushed by 
the regime, was intended to call to memory past episodes of regime mass violence against its people and 
                                               
33 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=276:speech-
delivered&catid=118&Itemid=496  
34 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=273:president-bashar-
al-assad-s-january-6th-2013-speech&catid=119&Itemid=496  
35 Retrieved from www.Syrian-freepress.wordpress.com  
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to invoke mediated narratives of fear, which were accentuated by fear of the Islamic State and other 
Islamist groups’ violent practices in Syria. 
 
In constructing the battle with regime opponents along an “us and them” binary and the uprising 
as a conspiracy against the nation, Assad sought both to exploit existing sectarian identifications and 
maintain sectarian solidarity among the minority Alawite sect to maintain power, underlining how, as Hilu 
Pinto (2017) argues, the inscription of sectarian frames is as an intentional political practice aimed at a 
“sectarian distribution of violence to deepen the sectarian fault lines among the protestors, dividing and 
isolating them” (p. 135).36 Such discursive practices are central to what some scholars have termed the 
sectarianization of the conflict, understood as intentional political practices by actors pursuing political 
goals that involve mobilization around religious identity markers (Hashemi & Postel, 2017), a practice that 
was omnipresent in regime practices and structures for decades before 2011 and has been at odds with 
the public regime narrative that sought to dissolve individual communities under a broader Syrian Arab 
identity. 
 
Reform and the Good Citizen Discourse 
 
In many of his speeches, Assad sought to reiterate his commitment to tanwir (reform) as a 
political ideology underpinning his reformist agenda that he espoused when he took power in 2000. 
However, in his speeches since the uprising, Assad consistently articulated reform as a process that could 
not be implemented without waging war against regime opponents or without the support of “mindful” or 
“good” citizens, effectively using the political language of reform to legitimize his regime’s violence and to 
invite Syrians to collaborate with the regime and, as such, ensure their obedience and complicity.37 
 
Assad’s mobilization of reform as a political language came across clearly in his first speech at 
Damascus University after the uprising in which he said that 
 
achieving reforms and development is not an internal need only, but it is a vital 
necessity for confronting these schemes; therefore, we have no choice but to succeed in 
the internal project as to succeed in our external one. Reform without security is like 
security without reform. Neither will be successful without the other. Those who keep 
parroting that Syria has opted for a security solution do not see or hear. We have 
repeatedly said that reforms and politics go in one hand and eliminating terrorism in the 
other.38 
                                               
36 It is worth noting that within a year of the uprising, the totalizing narrative that the conflict was 
sectarian with roots in a long-standing broader Sunni–Shiite struggle for dominance in the Middle East 
became a dominant narrative in interpretations and readings of the conflict. 
37 As discussed above, the Syrian regime’s reform project in the first decade of Bashar al-Assad’s rule saw 
an implicit collaboration among emerging economic elites, cultural producers, and the regime. 
38 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=359:president-al-assad-
2011-damascus-university-speech&catid=117&Itemid=496  
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In his January 6, 2013, speech to the National Assembly, almost two years after the uprising 
started, Assad deployed the language of reform to justify the war against his opponents as a war to 
defend reform and Syria’s national unity: 
 
Syria is in a state of war in the full sense of the word. We are repelling a fierce outside 
aggression in a new disguise, which is more lethal and dangerous than a traditional war, 
because they do not employ their tools to strike us; instead, they have us implement 
their projects, and target Syria using a bunch of Syrians and a lot of foreigners. . . . We 
are defending the homeland . . . and a reform that is necessary to all of us . . . [reform] 
. . . may not change the reality of war, yet it strengthens us and reinforces our unity in 
the face of the war.39 
 
In other speeches, Assad talked about reform as a process to improve citizens’ lives that 
demanded constant communication with citizens. As he stated, “If the Syrian citizen is our target, then he 
should be our starting point . . . and if our objective is to serve the citizen’s interests, then the citizen’s 
views should be our guiding light.”40 
 
In speaking about reforms as a series of initiatives to improve conditions for ordinary people, 
Assad invoked the language of what it means to be a good citizen underpinning the dominant Ba’thist 
culture of communication, which associated good citizenship with Arab nationalism and national unity. For 
example, in his speech at Damascus University on June 20, 2011, Assad argued that 
 
each citizen is responsible and able to provide something even if it is simple or limited in 
his/her view, because the homeland is for everyone; we all defend it, each according to 
his/her capacity and capability. Since the attack is launched against the homeland with 
all its human and material constituents, the mindful citizen has certainly known that 
passivity, waiting for time or others to solve the problem is a sort of pushing the country 
towards the abyss, and not contributing solutions is a kind of taking the homeland 
backwards with no progress towards overcoming what the homeland is going through.41 
 
In using this language, Assad sought to call on Syrians to join the regime’s battle against opponents, 
interpellating those “good citizens” whose duty was to defend the country against plotters and to embrace 
reform to enhance economic gains and individual progress, and thus effectively legitimize the regime’s 
                                               
39 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=273:president-bashar-
al-assad-s-january-6th-2013-speech&catid=119&Itemid=496  
40 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=276:speech-
delivered&catid=118&Itemid=496  
41 Retrieved from 
http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=359:president-al-assad-
2011-damascus-university-speech&catid=117&Itemid=496  
International Journal of Communication 13(2019)  The Syrian Regime’s Strategic Communication  2413 
vision of what it means to be a good Syrian. Indeed, in many of his speeches, Assad reiterated that 
reform would not progress without waging a war against regime opponents or without the support of 
those who were willing to engage in reform, a discourse, as Wedeen (2013) writes, “entailed fantasies of 
multi-cultural accommodation, domestic security and a sovereign national identity” (p. 842), thus 
cultivating an aspirational consciousness among the young generation as part of neoliberal plans42 on the 
one hand, while continuing to tether possibilities for advancement to citizen obedience and coercive 
control on the other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Syrian conflict has been described as the most documented and most violent war in modern 
times. It has also been described as the first networked conflict of the 21st century. Compared with other 
Arab uprisings and long-term conflicts in the Middle East, the conflict has featured spectacular forms of 
violence mediated through a wide range of digital and social media practices created by a variety of 
content by a host of political activists, witnesses, rebels, state agents, and soldiers, underlining how media 
are part of social and political processes and are fundamentally implicated in practices of war as well as 
the battle over ideologies, image, rhetoric, and politics. 
 
The Syrian conflict, at the time of writing this conclusion at the beginning of 2019, had entered a 
phase marked by a broad consensus that the Assad regime had practically defeated its opponents, 
regained control of most opposition-held areas, and managed to sustain its long-standing mediated 
regime of representation. Although it is difficult to offer any conclusive cause-and-effect reading of the 
conflict, given the complex endogenous and exogenous factors surrounding it, the conflict provides a 
productive context through which to address the regime’s strategic communication as a persistent regime 
practice of politics intended to sustain control, enforce obedience, and ensure the regime’s survival. This 
article acknowledges that such a reading of the regime’s strategic communication does not tell us how it is 
received, negotiated, and contested; nor does it conclusively suggest that it had been effective—in fact, 
different factors and variables, external and internal, played an important role in the direction of the eight-
year-old conflict and its outcome, as did the “ambiguities” surrounding digital technologies particularly in 
contexts of excessive mediation of violence, flux, and the abundance of digital voices and practices during 
the conflict. 
 
However, this article suggests that such a reading can help us understand how authoritarian 
regimes, such as Syria’s, continuously seek to produce their power through different practices, including 
discursive ones. Although these practices may not be evident, in conflict situations, they serve to 
underline that the “material reality of war” can no longer be separated from the “representational regimes 
through which [they] operate and which rationalize its own operation” (Butler, 2009, p. 29). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
42 There is no space here to discuss the implementation of this strategy in detail. 
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